Related papers: On the Construction of High Dimensional Simple Gam…
Assume $k$ candidates need to be selected. The candidates appear over time. Each time one appears, it must be immediately selected or rejected -- a decision that is made by a group of individuals through voting. Assume the voters use…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
We investigate a voting scenario with two groups of agents whose preferences depend on a ground truth that cannot be directly observed. The majority's preferences align with the ground truth, while the minorities disagree. Focusing on…
In many real world elections, agents are not required to rank all candidates. We study three of the most common methods used to modify voting rules to deal with such partial votes. These methods modify scoring rules (like the Borda count),…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
The voter model consists of a set of agents whose opinion is a binary variable. At each time step, an agent along with a social neighbor is selected and the agent imitates the social neighbor at the next time step. In this paper, we study a…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
In this paper new algorithm for calculating power indices is described. The complexity class of the problem is #P-complete and even calculating power index of the biggest player is NP-hard task. Constructed algorithm is a mix of ideas of…
We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can be computed in polynomial time as…
In content-oblivious computation, n nodes wish to compute a given task over an asynchronous network that suffers from an extremely harsh type of noise, which corrupts the content of all messages across all channels. In a recent work,…
The theory of influences in product measures has profound applications in theoretical computer science, combinatorics, and discrete probability. This deep theory is intimately connected to functional inequalities and to the Fourier analysis…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an…
Referring to a standard context of voting theory, and to the classic notion of voting situation, here we show that it is possible to observe any arbitrary set of elections' outcomes, no matter how paradoxical it may appear. On this purpose…
We introduce two-player games which build words over infinite alphabets, and we study the problem of checking the existence of winning strategies. These games are played by two players, who take turns in choosing valuations for variables…