Related papers: Semi-algebraic sets and equilibria of binary games
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…
Consider a semi-algebraic set A in R^d constructed from the sets which are determined by inequalities p_i(x)>0, p_i(x)\ge 0, or p_i(x)=0 for a given list of polynomials p_1,...,p_m. We prove several statements that fit into the following…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
We study the problem of computing all Nash equilibria of a subclass of finite normal form games. With algebraic characterization of the games, we present a method for computing all its Nash equilibria. Further, we present a method for…
Let S be a topological property of sequences (such as, for example, "to contain a convergent subsequence" or "to have an accumulation point"). We introduce the following open-point game OP(X,S) on a topological space X. In the n'th move,…
Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
We study multi-player turn-based games played on (potentially infinite) directed graphs. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We…
The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…
In this paper, we introduce a simplicial complex representation for finite non-cooperative games in the strategic form. The covering space of the simplicial game complex is introduced and we show that the covering complex is a powerful tool…
In this paper we introduce and study {\em all-pay bidding games}, a class of two player, zero-sum games on graphs. The game proceeds as follows. We place a token on some vertex in the graph and assign budgets to the two players. Each turn,…
The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure nor in mixed…
In this report, some properties of the set of Nash equilibria (NEs) of $2 \times 2$ zero-sum games are reviewed. In particular, the cardinality of the set of NEs is given in terms of the entries of the payoff matrix. Moreover, closed-form…
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…
We show that every finite semilattice can be represented as an atomized semilattice, an algebraic structure with additional elements (atoms) that extend the semilattice's partial order. Each atom maps to one subdirectly irreducible…
An $\alpha$-greedy balanced pair in an ordered set $P=(V,\leq)$ is a pair $(x,y)$ of elements of $V$ such that the proportion of greedy linear extensions of $P$ that put $x$ before $y$ among all greedy linear extensions is in the real…
Given a generic semidefinite program, specified by matrices with rational entries, each coordinate of its optimal solution is an algebraic number. We study the degree of the minimal polynomials of these algebraic numbers. Geometrically,…
The class of exact transferable utility coalitional games, introduced in 1972 by Schmeidler, has been studied both in the context of game theory and in the context of imprecise probabilities. We characterize the cone of exact games by…
We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…