Related papers: Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria …
Dialogue games are two-player logic games between a Proponent who puts forward a logical formula A as valid or true and an Opponent who disputes this. An advantage of the dialogical approach is that it is a uniform framework from which…
We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this…
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games…
This paper models games where the strategies are nodes of a graph G (we denote them as G-games) and in presence of coalition structures. The cases of one-shot and repeated games are presented. In the latter situation, coalitions are assumed…
We present a game semantics for Linear Logic, in which formulas denote games and proofs denote winning strategies. We show that our semantics yields a categorical model of Linear Logic and prove full completeness for Multiplicative Linear…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
We introduce operational semantics into games. And based on the operational semantics, we establish a full algebra of games, including basic algebra of games, algebra of concurrent games, recursion and abstraction. The algebra can be used…
We introduce Boolean Observation Games, a subclass of multi-player finite strategic games with incomplete information and qualitative objectives. In Boolean observation games, each player is associated with a finite set of propositional…
For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen's result can be…
We provide a compositional coalgebraic semantics for strategic games. In our framework, like in the semantics of functional programming languages, coalgebras represent the observable behaviour of systems derived from the behaviour of the…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…