Related papers: Robust Mediators in Large Games

We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

A key challenge in the study of multiagent cooperation is the need for individual agents not only to cooperate effectively, but to decide with whom to cooperate. This is particularly critical in situations when other agents have hidden,…

In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is…

Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…

Currently the Dempster-Shafer based algorithm and Uniform Random Probability based algorithm are the preferred method of resolving security games, in which defenders are able to identify attackers and only strategy remained ambiguous.…

Mediation analysis plays a crucial role in causal inference as it can investigate the pathways through which treatment influences outcome. Most existing mediation analysis assumes that mediation effects are static and homogeneous within…

We demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature of network games, bilateral strategic interactions, is equivalent to having player utilities that are additively separable across opponents. We distinguish two formal notions of bilateral strategic…

In this work we apply methods from cryptography to enable any number of mutually distrusting players to implement broad classes of mediated equilibria of strategic games without the need for trusted mediation. Our implementation makes use…

A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is involved in different games simultaneously. Interestingly,…

A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…

In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show…

As artificial agents proliferate, it is becoming increasingly important to ensure that their interactions with one another are well-behaved. In this paper, we formalize a common-sense notion of when algorithms are well-behaved: an algorithm…

Collaborative machine learning involves training models on data from multiple parties but must incentivize their participation. Existing data valuation methods fairly value and reward each party based on shared data or model parameters but…

A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…

A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…

Video Games are boring when they are too easy, and frustrating when they are too hard. In terms of providing game experience such as enjoyment to the player by match players with different levels of ability to player ability, We assume that…

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous…

This paper studies a two-player game in which the players face uncertainty regarding the nature of their partner. In this variation of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, players may encounter an 'honest' type who always cooperates.…