Related papers: Knowledge Sharing in Coalitions
The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The…
The existence of a coalition strategy to achieve a goal does not necessarily mean that the coalition has enough information to know how to follow the strategy. Neither does it mean that the coalition knows that such a strategy exists. The…
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had…
We present a variant of ATL with distributed knowledge operators based on a synchronous and perfect recall semantics. The coalition modalities in this logic are based on partial observation of the full history, and incorporate a form of…
The article considers strategies of coalitions that are based on intelligence information about moves of some of the other agents. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between…
Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influence each other's knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and…
Coalition logic is one of the most popular logics for multi-agent systems. While epistemic extensions of coalition logic have received much attention, existence of their complete axiomatisations has so far been an open problem. In this…
In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influence each other's knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and…
This paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over agent strategies. Unlike previous work on alternating temporal epistemic logic, the semantics works with systems whose states explicitly encode…
Information pooling has been extensively formalised across various logical frameworks in distributed systems, characterized by diverse information-sharing patterns. These approaches generally adopt an intersection perspective, aggregating…
We propose an extension of Strategy Logic (SL), in which one can both reason about strategizing under imperfect information and about players' knowledge. One original aspect of our approach is that we do not force strategies to be uniform,…
We use a novel type of epistemic logic, employing comparative knowledge assertions, to analyze the relative epistemic powers of individuals or groups of agents. Such comparative assertions can express that a group has the potential to…
The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall…
To be helpful assistants, AI agents must be aware of their own capabilities and limitations. This includes knowing when to answer from parametric knowledge versus using tools, when to trust tool outputs, and when to abstain or hedge. Such…
This work studies the learning abilities of agents sharing partial beliefs over social networks. The agents observe data that could have risen from one of several hypotheses and interact locally to decide whether the observations they are…
In human-agent teams, openly sharing goals is often assumed to enhance planning, collaboration, and effectiveness. However, direct communication of these goals is not always feasible, requiring teammates to infer their partner's intentions…
Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying…
This paper studies the relations between agent performances and their intellective abilities in mix-games in which there are two groups of agents: one group plays a minority game, and the other plays a majority game. These two groups have…