Related papers: Fast Algorithms for Game-Theoretic Centrality Meas…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…
This paper studies how to attain fairness in communication for omniscience, where a set of users exchange their observations of a discrete multiple random source to attain omniscience---the state that all users recover the entire source.…
The latest developments in AI focus on agentic systems where artificial and human agents cooperate to realize global goals. An example is collaborative learning, which aims to train a global model based on data from individual agents. A…
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
Explaining machine learning models is an important and increasingly popular area of research interest. The Shapley value from game theory has been proposed as a prime approach to compute feature importance towards model predictions on…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function $C$ is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be derived from data, represented as tuples $(S, C(S))$, for different subsets $S$ of…
The most important factors which contribute to the efficiency of game-theoretical algorithms are time and game complexity. In this study, we have offered an elegant method to deal with high complexity of game theoretic multi-objective…
We consider the problem of how to determine a fair source coding rate allocation method for the lossless data compression problem in multiterminal networks, e.g, the wireless sensor network where there are a large number of sources to be…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
We introduce a game-theoretic approach to the study of recommendation systems with strategic content providers. Such systems should be fair and stable. Showing that traditional approaches fail to satisfy these requirements, we propose the…
In this paper we formally define the hierarchical clustering network problem (HCNP) as the problem to find a good hierarchical partition of a network. This new problem focuses on the dynamic process of the clustering rather than on the…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
This paper generalizes L.S. Shapley's celebrated value allocation theory on coalition games by discovering and applying a fundamental connection between stochastic path integration driven by canonical time-reversible Markov chains and…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
In this paper the Shapley value of digraph (directed graph) games are considered. Digraph games are transferable utility (TU) games with limited cooperation among players, where players are represented by nodes. A restrictive relation…