Related papers: Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolut…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Motivated by learning of correlated equilibria in non-cooperative games, we perform a large deviations analysis of a regret minimizing stochastic approximation algorithm. The regret minimization algorithm we consider comprises multiple…
Individual cooperative strategy influences the surrounding dynamic population, which in turn affects cooperative strategy. To better model this phenomenon, we develop a Markov decision chain based game transitions model and examine the…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
Horizontal gene transfer consists in exchanging genetic materials between microorganisms during their lives. This is a major mechanism of bacterial evolution and is believed to be of main importance in antibiotics resistance. We consider a…
This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and…
In most studies regarding evolutionary game dynamics, the effective payoff, a quantity that translates the payoff derived from game interactions into reproductive success, is usually assumed to be a specific function of the payoff.…
Stochastic processes can model many emerging phenomena on networks, like the spread of computer viruses, rumors, or infectious diseases. Understanding the dynamics of such stochastic spreading processes is therefore of fundamental interest.…
Heterogeneities in environmental conditions often induce corresponding heterogeneities in the distribution of species. In the extreme case of a localized patch of increased growth rates, reproducing populations can become strongly…
An ab-initio numerical study of the density-dependent, evolutionary stable dispersal strategy is presented. The simulations are based on a simple discretei generation island model with four processes: reproduction, dispersal, competition…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
We establish average consensus on graphs with dynamic topologies prescribed by evolutionary games among strategic agents. Each agent possesses a private reward function and dynamically decides whether to create new links and/or whether to…
We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the…
Convergence of discrete-time Markov chains with two timescales is a powerful tool to study stochastic evolutionary games in subdivided populations. Focusing on linear games within demes, convergence to a diffusion process for the strategy…
The sustainable management of common resources often leads to a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the commons: individuals benefit from rapid extraction of resources, while communities as a whole benefit from more sustainable…
Preferential attachment schemes, where the selection mechanism is linear and possibly time-dependent, are considered, and an infinite-dimensional large deviation principle for the sample path evolution of the empirical degree distribution…
The growth of a population divided among spatial sites, with migration between the sites, is sometimes modelled by a product of random matrices, with each diagonal elements representing the growth rate in a given time period, and…
Evolutionary games on graphs describe how strategic interactions and population structure determine evolutionary success, quantified by the probability that a single mutant takes over a population. Graph structures, compared to the…