Related papers: Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Me…
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using…
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…
We introduce a framework for comparing the privacy of different mechanisms. A mechanism designer employs a dynamic protocol to elicit agents' private information. Protocols produce a set of contextual privacy violations -- information…
Auction is applied for trade with various mechanisms. A simple but practical question is which mechanism, typically first-price or second-price auctions, is preferred from the perspective of bidders or sellers. A celebrated answer is…
The goal of this paper is to propose a framework for representing and reasoning about the rules governing a combinatorial exchange. Such a framework is at first interest as long as we want to build up digital marketplaces based on auction,…
Diffusion auction refers to an emerging paradigm of online marketplace where an auctioneer utilises a social network to attract potential buyers. Diffusion auction poses significant privacy risks. From the auction outcome, it is possible to…
We present a new model-based interpolation procedure for satisfiability modulo theories (SMT). The procedure uses a new mode of interaction with the SMT solver that we call solving modulo a model. This either extends a given partial model…
Throttling is a popular method of budget management for online ad auctions in which the platform modulates the participation probability of an advertiser in order to smoothly spend her budget across many auctions. In this work, we…
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…
We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. \citet{kolumbus2022auctions} showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders participate in second-price auctions using no-regret bidding…
From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We introduce several new estimation methods that leverage shape constraints in auction models to estimate various objects of interest, including the distribution of a bidder's valuations, the bidder's ex ante expected surplus, and the…
We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general…