Related papers: Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Me…
We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in subadditive combinatorial auctions. This problem was originally introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren (STOC'14) as the following simple market scenario: $m$…
Feasible interpolation is a general technique for proving proof complexity lower bounds. The monotone version of the technique converts, in its basic variant, lower bounds for monotone Boolean circuits separating two NP-sets to proof…
Recent spectrum auctions in the United Kingdom, and some proposals for future auctions of spectrum in the United States, are based on preliminary price discovery rounds, followed by calculation of final prices for the winning buyers. For…
This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation mechanism of Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan for combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum valuations. The new implementation uses only value…
We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with $m$ items and two subadditive bidders. A $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation can be guaranteed by a trivial randomized protocol with zero communication, or…
Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…
In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility,…
Model merging, typically on Instruct and Thinking models, has shown remarkable performance for efficient reasoning. In this paper, we systematically revisit the simplest merging method that interpolates two weights directly. Particularly,…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios…
A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the competitors. This…
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent $i$ has a private signal $s_i$ that captures her private information, and the valuation function of every agent depends on the entire signal…
Interpolation is an important property of classical and many non-classical logics that has been shown to have interesting applications in computer science and AI. Here we study the Interpolation Property for the the non-monotonic system of…
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…
High-stakes auctions are often preceded by nonbinding communication between bidders and the seller. Motivated by these practices, this paper examines a two-period model in which two bidders send private cheap talk messages to the seller…
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks -- in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions -- quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if the bidders valuation functions are submodular over…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive…
Truthfulness is fragile and demanding. It is oftentimes computationally harder than solving the original problem. Even worse, truthfulness can be utterly destroyed by small uncertainties in a mechanism's outcome. One obstacle is that…