Related papers: Do Prices Coordinate Markets?
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
We develop conditions under which individual choices and Walrasian equilibrium prices and allocations can be exactly inferred from finite market data. First, we consider market data that consist of individual demands as prices and incomes…
The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…
We propose a new methodology to compute equilibria for general equilibrium problems on exchange economies with real financial markets, home-production, and retention. We demonstrate that equilibrium prices can be determined by solving a…
We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…
Walrasian equilibrium is a prominent market equilibrium notion, but rarely exists in markets with indivisible items. We introduce a new market equilibrium notion, called two-price equilibrium (2PE). A 2PE is a relaxation of Walrasian…
General equilibrium, the cornerstone of modern economics and finance, rests on assumptions many markets do not meet. Spectrum auctions, electricity markets, and cap-and-trade programs for resource rights often feature non-convexities in…
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that…
We study the conflict between two links in a multiple-input single-output interference channel. This setting is strictly competitive and can be related to perfectly competitive market models. In such models, general equilibrium theory is…
We consider a financial market in which traders potentially face restrictions in trading some of the available securities. Traders are heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs and risk profiles, and the market is assumed thin: traders…
Pricing decisions are often made when market information is still poor. In turn, existing theoretical models often reason about the response of optimal prices to changing market characteristics without exploiting all available information…
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept…
In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing social welfare in combinatorial markets through pricing schemes. We consider the existence of prices that are capable to achieve optimal social welfare without a central tie-breaking…
Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. Unfortunately, this assumes carefully breaking ties amongst…
In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…
I introduce a concave function of allocations and prices -- the economy's potential -- which measures the difference between utilitarian social welfare and its dual. I show that Walrasian equilibria correspond to roots of the potential:…
Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…