Related papers: Global Games with Noisy Information Sharing
Global games are a class of incomplete information games where the payoffs exhibit strategic complementarity leading to an incentive for the agents to coordinate their actions. Such games have been used to model scenarios in many…
We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
We consider misinformation games, i.e., multi-agent interactions where the players are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an \emph{incorrect} understanding of the game setting, without being aware of…
We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to…
We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more…