Related papers: Selfish Knapsack
Stochastic linear bandits are a fundamental model for sequential decision making, where an agent selects a vector-valued action and receives a noisy reward with expected value given by an unknown linear function. Although well studied in…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, under matroid constraints and two generalizations: $p$-extendible system and independence system constraints. The objective is to…
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
We study the cooperative stochastic $k$-armed bandit problem, where a network of $m$ agents collaborate to find the optimal action. In contrast to most prior work on this problem, which focuses on extending a specific algorithm to the…
We consider a contextual version of multi-armed bandit problem with global knapsack constraints. In each round, the outcome of pulling an arm is a scalar reward and a resource consumption vector, both dependent on the context, and the…
We consider a general class of binary packing problems with a convex quadratic knapsack constraint. We prove that these problems are APX-hard to approximate and present constant-factor approximation algorithms based upon three different…
We consider the Max $K$-Armed Bandit problem, where a learning agent is faced with several sources (arms) of items (rewards), and interested in finding the best item overall. At each time step the agent chooses an arm, and obtains a random…
In an instance of the weighted Nash Social Welfare problem, we are given a set of $m$ indivisible items, $\mathscr{G}$, and $n$ agents, $\mathscr{A}$, where each agent $i \in \mathscr{A}$ has a valuation $v_{ij}\geq 0$ for each item $j\in…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
Recent works have shown that agents facing independent instances of a stochastic $K$-armed bandit can collaborate to decrease regret. However, these works assume that each agent always recommends their individual best-arm estimates to other…
We consider the Bilevel Knapsack with Interdiction Constraints, an extension of the classic 0-1 knapsack problem formulated as a Stackelberg game with two agents, a leader and a follower, that choose items from a common set and hold their…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
The purpose of this paper is to provide further understanding into the structure of the sequential allocation ("stochastic multi-armed bandit", or MAB) problem by establishing probability one finite horizon bounds and convergence rates for…
We prove new lower bounds for suitable competitive ratio measures of two relaxed online packing problems: online removable multiple knapsack, and a recently introduced online minimum peak appointment scheduling problem. The high level…
We consider a discrete-time bipartite matching model with random arrivals of units of supply and demand that can wait in queues located at the nodes in the network. A control policy determines which are matched at each time. The focus is on…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
Knapsack is one of the most fundamental problems in theoretical computer science. In the $(1 - \epsilon)$-approximation setting, although there is a fine-grained lower bound of $(n + 1 / \epsilon) ^ {2 - o(1)}$ based on the $(\min,…
In this paper, we study the stochastic submodular maximization problem with dependent items subject to packing constraints such as matroid and knapsack constraints. The input of our problem is a finite set of items, and each item is in a…