Related papers: Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: Common …
We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features explicit communication actions, by which the entire observation history of a player is revealed to another player. Such full-information protocols are common in…
In this paper, we investigate a sequential dynamic team problem consisting of two agents with a nested information structure. We use a combination of the person-by-person and prescription approach to derive structural results for optimal…
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well…
Systems such as sensor networks and teams of autonomous robots consist of multiple autonomous entities that interact with each other in a distributed, asynchronous manner. These entities need to keep track of the state of the system as it…
Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.…
Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…
If the influence diagram (ID) depicting a Bayesian game is common knowledge to its players then additional assumptions may allow the players to make use of its embodied irrelevance statements. They can then use these to discover a simpler…
We describe a formulation of multi-agents operating within a Cyber-Physical System, resulting in collaborative or adversarial games. We show that the non-determinism inherent in the communication medium between agents and the underlying…
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…
Game dynamics, which describe how agents' strategies evolve over time based on past interactions, can exhibit a variety of undesirable behaviours including convergence to suboptimal equilibria, cycling, and chaos. While central planners can…
For tasks where the dynamics of multiple agents are physically coupled, e.g., in cooperative manipulation, the coordination between the individual agents becomes crucial, which requires exact knowledge of the interaction dynamics. This…
We analyze independent policy-gradient (PG) learning in $N$-player linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic differential games. Each player employs a distributed policy that depends only on its own state and updates the policy independently using…
Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical frame- work for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of…
We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which, in…
Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…
This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability…
In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…
We introduce a distributed, cooperative framework and method for Bayesian estimation and control in decentralized agent networks. Our framework combines joint estimation of time-varying global and local states with information-seeking…
The analysis of large population economies with incomplete information often entails the integration of a continuum of random variables. We showcase the usefulness of the integral notion \`a la Pettis (1938) to study such models. We present…