Related papers: A Bridge between Bilevel Programs and Nash Games
Solution methods for generalized Nash equilibrium have been dominated by variational inequalities and complementarity problems. Since these approaches fundamentally rely on the sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions for the…
The equilibrium selection problem in the variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (v-GNEP) has been reported as an optimization problem defined over the solution set of v-GNEP, called in this paper the lower-level v-GNEP. However,…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
The equilibrium selection problem in the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) has recently been studied as an optimization problem, defined over the set of all variational equilibria achievable through a lower-level non-cooperative…
This paper presents a new primal-dual method for computing an equilibrium of generalized (continuous) Nash game (referred to as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP)) where each player's feasible strategy set depends on the other…
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) arise in many applications, including non-cooperative multi-agent control problems. Although many methods exist for finding generalized Nash equilibria, most of them rely on assuming knowledge…
We study Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables in which each player solves a mixed-integer optimization problem parameterized by the rivals' strategies. We distinguish between standard Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs),…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making…
This paper presents an exact penalization theory of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) that has its origin from the renowned Arrow-Debreu general economic equilibrium model. While the latter model is the foundation of much of…
We propose a learning-based approach for approximating solution mappings of multiparametric generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with coupling in both objectives and constraints. Rather than solving a standard regression problem on…
In this paper we present optimization problems with biconvex objective function and linear constraints such that the set of global minima of the optimization problems is the same as the set of Nash equilibria of a n-player general-sum…
Dynamic games can be an effective approach to modeling interactive behavior between multiple non-cooperative agents and they provide a theoretical framework for simultaneous prediction and control in such scenarios. In this work, we propose…
We propose an augmented Lagrangian-type algorithm for the solution of generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs). Specifically, we discuss the convergence properties with regard to both feasibility and optimality of limit points. This is…
In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…
We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible…
We present a method to compute explicit solutions of parametric Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) problems with convex quadratic cost functions and linear coupling and local constraints. Assuming the parameters only enter the linear terms…
In Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), a population reaches a Nash equilibrium when none of the agents can improve its objective by solely changing its strategy on its own. Roughly speaking, this equilibrium is a protection against betrayal.…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions. This general class of games includes the important case of games with mixed-integer variables for which only a few…
Any individual's preference represents his choice in the set of available options. It is said to be complete if the person can compare any pair of available options. We aim to initiate the notion of projected solutions for the generalized…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…