Related papers: Monotonicity and Competitive Equilibrium in Cake-c…

We consider a setting in which a single divisible good ("cake") needs to be divided between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake. For this setting, we address the problem of finding divisions…

We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…

We fully solve a sorting problem with heterogeneous firms and multiple heterogeneous workers whose skills are imperfect substitutes. We show that optimal sorting, which we call mixed and countermonotonic, is comprised of two regions. In the…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing fair allocations for $n$ agents, in the Robertson-Webb query model. In this model, it is known that: (i) proportional allocations can be computed using $O(n \log n)$ queries, and…

Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all goods or all chores, divisible or indivisible. The celebrated…

We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…

We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is…

We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated…

We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service to customers. The service quality of a firm - from the perspective of a customer - depends on the congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price for…

We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they…

Several different fairness notions have been introduced in the context of fair allocation of goods. In this manuscript, we compare between some fairness notions that are used in settings in which agents have arbitrary (perhaps unequal)…

The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing the fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of cake cutting, in which…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

Firms (businesses, service providers, entertainment organizations, political parties, etc.) advertise on social networks to draw people's attention and improve their awareness of the brands of the firms. In all such cases, the competitive…

We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…

We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…

In statistical physics, the conservation of particle number results in the equalization of the chemical potential throughout a system at equilibrium. In contrast, the homogeneity of utility in socio-economic models is usually thought to…

Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual…