Related papers: Boolean Hedonic Games
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
We study two forms of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players, one classical and other quantum. In its classical form making a coalition gives advantage to players and they are motivated to do so. However in its quantum form…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
The concept of forming harmonious coalitions is introduced to both classical and quantum symmetric cooperative game. In both cases, players are motivated to form coalitions. Also, the main feature of the cooperative game is conserved.
Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…
We develop a theory of combinatorial games that is appropriate for describing positions in Hex and other monotone set coloring games. We consider two natural conditions on such games: a game is monotone if all moves available to both…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
In hedonic diversity games (HDGs), recently introduced by Bredereck, Elkind and Igarashi (2019), each agent belongs to one of two classes (men and women, vegetarians and meat-eaters, junior and senior researchers), and agents' preferences…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game…
Many settings of interest involving humans and machines -- from virtual personal assistants to autonomous vehicles -- can naturally be modelled as principals (humans) delegating to agents (machines), which then interact with each other on…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through…