Related papers: The master equation and the convergence problem in…

For two classes of Mean Field Game systems we study the convergence of solutions as the interest rate in the cost functional becomes very large, modeling agents caring only about a very short time-horizon, and the cost of the control…

We formulate the MFG limit for $N$ interacting agents with a common noise as a single quasi-linear deterministic infinite-dimensional partial differential second order backward equation. We prove that any its (regular enough) solution…

We consider time-dependent mean-field games with congestion that are given by a system of a Hamilton-Jacobi equation coupled with a Fokker-Planck equation. The congestion effects make the Hamilton-Jacobi equation singular. These models are…

We prove stochastic homogenization for a class of non-convex and non-coercive first-order Hamilton-Jacobi equations in a finite-range-dependence environment for Hamiltonians that can be expressed by a max-min formula. Exploiting the…

Many real-world problems modeled by stochastic games have huge state and/or action spaces, leading to the well-known curse of dimensionality. The complexity of the analysis of large-scale systems is dramatically reduced by exploiting mean…

The objective of this work is to study the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria in mean field games involving a major player and a continuum of minor players over finite intervals of arbitrary length. Following earlier…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

In this paper, we study a class of degenerate mean field game systems arising from the mean field games with H\"ormander diffusion, where the generic player may have a ``forbidden'' direction at some point. Here we prove the existence and…

In this article we consider a special class of Nash equilibrium problems that cannot be reduced to a single player control problem. Problems of this type can be solved by a semi-smooth Newton method. Applying results from the established…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

We study the regularity and long time behavior of the one-dimensional, local, first-order mean field games system and the planning problem, assuming a Hamiltonian of superlinear growth, with a non-separated, strictly monotone dependence on…

It is well known that the monotonicity condition, either in Lasry-Lions sense or in displacement sense, is crucial for the global well-posedness of mean field game master equations, as well as for the uniqueness of mean field equilibria and…

The goal of this paper is to provide a selection principle for potential mean field games on a finite state space and, in this respect, to show that equilibria that do not minimize the corresponding mean field control problem should be…

We formulate a class of mean field games on a finite state space with variational principles resembling those in continuous-state mean field games. We construct a controlled continuity equation featuring a nonlinear activation function on…

We study the asymptotic behavior of solutions to the constrained MFG system as the time horizon $T$ goes to infinity. For this purpose, we analyze first Hamilton-Jacobi equations with state constraints from the viewpoint of weak KAM theory,…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

We develop a theory of existence and uniqueness of solutions of MFG master equations when the initial condition is Lipschitz continuous. Namely, we show that as long as the solution of the master equation is Lipschitz continuous in space,…

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…

We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…