Related papers: On repeated zero-sum games with incomplete informa…

We revisit the question of modeling incomplete information among 2 Bayesian players, following an ex-ante approach based on values of zero-sum games. $K$ being the finite set of possible parameters, an information structure is defined as a…

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We introduce a simple class of mean field games with absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding $N$-player games, the evolution of players' states is described by a system of weakly interacting It\^o equations with…

A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. The main object of combinatorial game theory is to obtain the outcome, which player has a winning strategy, of a given combinatorial game. Positions of…

We consider a collective version of Parrondo's games with probabilities parametrized by rho in (0,1) in which a fraction phi in (0,1] of an infinite number of players collectively choose and individually play at each turn the game that…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…

We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…

In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…

We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…

This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…

In this paper, we consider zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer is restricted to strategies requiring no more than a limited amount of randomness. Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…

In this paper we introduce and study {\em all-pay bidding games}, a class of two player, zero-sum games on graphs. The game proceeds as follows. We place a token on some vertex in the graph and assign budgets to the two players. Each turn,…

In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization…