Related papers: Large Market Games with Near Optimal Efficiency
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…
We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…
We study a toy two-player game for periodic double auction markets to generate liquidity. The game has imperfect information, which allows us to link market spreads with signal strength. We characterize Nash equilibria in cases with or…
As electricity consumption grows, reducing peak demand--the maximum load on the grid--has become critical for preventing infrastructure strain and blackouts. Pricing mechanisms that incentivize consumers with flexible loads to shift…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of the price of anarchy takes a worst-case stance to efficiency analysis,…
Internet ad auctions have evolved from a few lines of text to richer informational layouts that include images, sitelinks, videos, etc. Ads in these new formats occupy varying amounts of space, and an advertiser can provide multiple…
In this paper, we examine in an abstract framework, how a tradeoff between efficiency and robustness arises in different dynamic oligopolistic market architectures. We consider a market in which there is a monopolistic resource provider and…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
In selfish bin packing, each item is regarded as a selfish player, who aims to minimize the cost-share by choosing a bin it can fit in. To have a least number of bins used, cost-sharing rules play an important role. The currently best known…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
We investigate a traffic assignment problem on a transportation network, considering both the demands of individual drivers and of a large fleet controlled by a central operator (minimizing the fleet's average travel time). We formulate…
Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…
Traditional methods for computing equilibria in auctions become computationally intractable as auction complexity increases, particularly in multi-item and dynamic auctions. This paper introduces a self-play based reinforcement learning…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, or remain completely unused, as in the Covid-19 pandemic, where social distance constraints are enforced to limit the number of people who can share public…
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)$ for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior…
All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) famously stated that prices fully reflect the information available to traders. This critically depends on the transfer of information into prices through trading strategies. Traders optimise their…