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The malicious manipulation of quantum key distribution (QKD) hardware is a serious threat to its security, as, typically, neither end users nor QKD manufacturers can validate the integrity of every component of their QKD system in practice.…
The local oscillator in practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system fluctuates at any time during the key distribution process, which may open security loopholes for the eavesdropper to hide her eavesdropping behaviors.…
When there exists a malicious attacker in the network, we need to be careful of eavesdropping and contamination. This problem is crucial for network communication when the network is realized by a partially trusted relay of quantum key…
We investigate the security against collective attacks of a continuous variable quantum key distribution scheme in the asymptotic key limit for a realistic setting. The quantum channel connecting the two honest parties is assumed to be…
Information-theoretically secure communications are possible when channel noise is usable and when the channel has an intrinsic characteristic that a legitimate receiver (Bob) can use the noise more advantageously than an eavesdropper…
We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of…
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secure communications between two parties based on physical laws. However, most of the security proofs of QKD today make unrealistic assumptions and neglect many relevant device…
In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the additional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework for a post-selection based…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security based on the fundamental laws of physics. However, device imperfections, such as those in active modulators, may introduce side-channel leakage, thus compromising…
The security of quantum cryptography is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem, which implies that an eavesdropper copying transmitted qubits in unknown states causes their disturbance. Nevertheless, in real cryptographic systems some level…
We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…
We address the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with squeezed states upon realistic conditions of noisy and lossy environment and limited reconciliation efficiency. Considering the generalized preparation scheme and…
Quantum key distribution is often regarded as an unconditionally secure method to exchange a secret key by harnessing fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics. Despite the robustness of key exchange, classical post-processing reveals…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
This paper presents a method of cryptographic key distribution using an `artificially' noisy channel. This is an important development because, while it is known that a noisy channel can be used to generate unconditional secrecy, there are…
Today's information society relies on cryptography to achieve security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation for digital communications. Here, public-key cryptosystems play a pivotal role to share…
Quantum key distribution is a way to distribute secret keys to distant users with information theoretic security and key rates suitable for real-world applications. Its rate-distance figure, however, is limited by the natural loss of the…
We identify and study a new security loophole in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) implementations, related to the imperfect linearity of the homodyne detector. By exploiting this loophole, we propose an active…
We prove a lower bound on the information leakage of any classical protocol computing the equality function in the simultaneous message passing (SMP) model. Our bound is valid in the finite length regime and is strong enough to demonstrate…
In a practical continuous-variable quantum-key distribution (CVQKD), the fluctuations of the local oscillator (LO) not only make the normalization of Bob's measurement outcomes difficult, but also can change the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)…