Related papers: Inspection games in a mean field setting
We propose a new approach to mean field games with major and minor players. Our formulation involves a two player game where the optimization of the representative minor player is standard while the major player faces an optimization over…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…
Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum continuous games is a central problem in machine learning, e.g. for training both GANs and robust models. The existence of pure Nash equilibria requires strong conditions which are not…
The policy iteration method is a classical algorithm for solving optimal control problems. In this paper, we introduce a policy iteration method for Mean Field Games systems, and we study the convergence of this procedure to a solution of…
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…
This paper studies the convergence problem for mean field games with common noise. We define a suitable notion of weak mean field equilibria, which we prove captures all subsequential limit points, as $n\to\infty$, of closed-loop…
In this paper we examine fully nonlinear mean-field games associated with a minimization problem. The variational setting is driven by a functional depending on its argument through its Hessian matrix. We work under fairly natural…
In this work, we study a class of stationary mean-field games of singular stochastic control under model uncertainty. The representative agent adjusts the dynamics of an It\^o diffusion via one-sided singular stochastic control, aiming to…
We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…
We present a simpler proof of the existence of equilibria for a class of mean field games with common noise, where players interact through the conditional law given the current value of the common noise rather than its entire path. By…
Mean-field games (MFG) were introduced to efficiently analyze approximate Nash equilibria in large population settings. In this work, we consider entropy-regularized mean-field games with a finite state-action space in a discrete time…
This article considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion models in which agents aim at reaching a given target set and wish to minimize a cost consisting of an individual running cost, an individual cost depending on the…
This paper studies an optimal investment-consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
We study dynamic finite-player and mean-field stochastic games within the framework of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). Our focus is on discrete time and space structures without monotonicity. Unlike their continuous-time analogues,…
We investigate mean field games for players, who are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. To this end we investigate time-dependent pure jump type propagators over a finite space in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We…
Independent learners are agents that employ single-agent algorithms in multi-agent systems, intentionally ignoring the effect of other strategic agents. This paper studies mean-field games from a decentralized learning perspective, with two…
We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…
We study zero-sum games in the space of probability distributions over the Euclidean space $\mathbb{R}^d$ with entropy regularization, in the setting when the interaction function between the players is smooth and strongly convex-strongly…