Related papers: Condorcet Domains, Median Graphs and the Single Cr…
A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which satisfy an acyclic majority relation. In this paper we describe domains as collections of directed Hamilton paths. We prove that while Black's single-peaked domains are defined by…
Demange (2012) generalized the classical single-crossing property to the intermediate property on median graphs and proved that the representative voter theorem still holds for this more general framework. We complement her result with…
We generalize the classical single-crossing property to single-crossing property on trees and obtain new ways to construct Condorcet domains which are sets of linear orders which possess the property that every profile composed from those…
A Condorcet domain (CD) is a collection of linear orders on a set of candidates satisfying the following property: for any choice of preferences of voters from this collection, a simple majority rule does not yield cycles. We propose a…
Condorcet domains are fundamental objects in the theory of majority voting; they are sets of linear orders with the property that if every voter picks a linear order from this set, assuming that the number of voters is odd, and alternatives…
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever voters' preferences are restricted to the domain, the pairwise majority relation (for an odd number of voters) is transitive and hence a linear order. Determining…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
In this paper we give the first explicit enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains on $n\leq 7$ alternatives. This has been accomplished by developing a new algorithm for constructing Condorcet domains, and an implementation of that…
We uncover a new relation between Closeness centrality and the Condorcet principle. We define a Condorcet winner in a graph as a node that compared to any other node is closer to more nodes. In other words, if we assume that nodes vote on a…
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…
We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
In this paper we consider a Condorcet domain (CD) formed by a rhombus tiling as a voting design and consider a problem of aggregation of voting designs using majority rule. A Condorcet super-domain is a collection of CDs obtained from…
The most studied class of Condorcet domains (acyclic sets of linear orders) is the class of peak-pit domains of maximal width. It has a number of combinatorial representations by such familiar combinatorial objects like rhombus tilings and…
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the set of Condorcet winners whenever…
A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is the minimum cardinality of a Condorcet winning set, is known…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
A Condorcet cycle election is an election (often called a Social Welfare Function, or SWF) between three candidates, where each voter ranks the three candidates according to a fixed cyclic order. Maskin showed that if such a SWF obeys the…
Popular matchings provide a model of matching under preferences in which a solution corresponds to a Condorcet winner in voting systems. In a bipartite graph in which the vertices have preferences over their neighbours, a matching is…
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…