Related papers: Conservative and Dissipative Polymatrix Replicator…
We introduce a class of o.d.e.'s that generalizes to polymatrix games the replicator equations on symmetric and asymmetric games. We also introduce a new class of Poisson structures on the phase space of these systems, and characterize the…
We introduce an algorithm to find possible constants of motion for a given replicator equation. The algorithm is inspired by Dirac geometry and a Hamiltonian description for the replicator equations with such constants of motion, up to a…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
In a previous paper [3] we have studied flows defined on polytopes, presenting a new method to encapsulate its asymptotic dynamics along the edge-vertex heteroclinic network. These results apply to the class of polymatrix replicator…
The replicator equations are a family of ordinary differential equations that arise in evolutionary game theory, and are closely related to Lotka-Volterra. We produce an infinite family of replicator equations which are Liouville-Arnold…
We consider the general properties of the replicator dynamical system from the standpoint of its evolution and stability. Vector field analysis as well as spectral properties of such system has been studied. Lyaponuv function for…
Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…
We propose a minimal model of the dynamics of diversity -- replicator equations with extinction, invasion and mutation. We numerically study the behavior of this simple model and show that it displays completely different behavior from the…
The Volterra lattice is a well-known integrable family that is also a special class of replicator dynamics and whose members can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the directed cycle graphs. In this paper, we study a variation of the…
The prototype of a cyclic dominant system is the so-called rock-scissors-paper game, but similar relation among competing strategies can be identified in several other models of evolutionary game theory. In this work we assume that a…
The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies,…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
In this paper we present a new modelling framework combining replicator dynamics (which is the standard model of frequency dependent selection) with the model of an age-structured population. The new framework allows for the modelling of…
Replicator dynamics have been widely used in evolutionary game theory to model how strategy frequencies evolve over time in large populations. The so-called payoff matrix encodes the pairwise fitness that each strategy obtains when…
The replicator equation is one of the fundamental tools to study evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed populations. This paper contributes to the literature on evolutionary graph theory, providing a version of the replicator equation for a…
In the framework of Lotka-Volterra dynamics with evolutionary parameter variation, it is shown that a system of two competing species which is evolutionarily unstable, if left to themselves, is stabilized by a commmon predator preying on…
In this work, we examine a kinetic framework for modeling the time evolution of size distribution densities of two populations governed by predator-prey interactions. The model builds upon the classical Boltzmann-type equations, where the…
Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms…
Starting with a group of reinforcement-learning agents we derive coupled replicator equations that describe the dynamics of collective learning in multiagent systems. We show that, although agents model their environment in a…
We consider a model of learning and evolution in games whose action sets are endowed with a partition-based similarity structure intended to capture exogenous similarities between strategies. In this model, revising agents have a higher…