Related papers: Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown Markets
We consider the Arrow--Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents' demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for…
We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with linear utilities. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the weakly-polynomial Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm. We use the DM…
We present an improved combinatorial algorithm for the computation of equilibrium prices in the linear Arrow-Debreu model. For a market with $n$ agents and integral utilities bounded by $U$, the algorithm runs in $O(n^7 \log^3 (nU))$ time.…
We show an auction-based algorithm to compute market equilibrium prices in a production model, where consumers purchase items under separable nonlinear utility concave functions which satisfy W.G.S(Weak Gross Substitutes); producers produce…
We present the first combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for computing the equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu market model with linear utilities.
We present a combinatorial algorithm for determining the market clearing prices of a general linear Arrow-Debreu market, where every agent can own multiple goods. The existing combinatorial algorithms for linear Arrow-Debreu markets…
We present the first polynomial time algorithm for computing Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with indivisible goods and \emph{general} buyer valuations having only access to an \emph{aggregate demand oracle}, i.e., an oracle that given…
We prove that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-complete even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utility functions. In fact, our proof shows that this market-equilibrium…
Motivated by the convergence result of mirror-descent algorithms to market equilibria in linear Fisher markets, it is natural for one to consider designing dynamics (specifically, iterative algorithms) for agents to arrive at linear…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
We develop a unified ascending-auction framework for computing Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with strong substitutes valuations and piecewise-linear payment functions. Our auction extends the celebrated ascending auctions of…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
The Arrow-Debreu extension of the classic Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme for a one-sided matching market -- called ADHZ in this paper -- has natural applications but has instances which do not admit equilibria. By introducing approximation, we…
Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant…
Electricity market operators worldwide use mixed-integer linear programming to solve the allocation problem in wholesale electricity markets. Prices are typically determined based on the duals of relaxed versions of this optimization…
It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium in Fisher's spending model is easier than computing a market equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu's exchange model. This belief is built on the fact that we have more algorithmic success in…
This paper revisits the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework through the lens of effective trade, emphasizing the distinction between theoretical and realizable market interactions. We develop the Effective Trade Model (ETM), where…
We study the equilibrium computation problem in the Fisher market model with constrained piecewise linear concave (PLC) utilities. This general class captures many well-studied special cases, including markets with PLC utilities, markets…
Large-scale competitive market equilibrium problems arise in a wide range of important applications, including economic decision-making and intelligent manufacturing. Traditional solution methods, such as interior-point algorithms and…
We introduce the notion of non-monotone utilities, which covers a wide variety of utility functions in economic theory. We then prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium in markets with linear and…