Related papers: Representation-Compatible Power Indices
The voter model consists of a set of agents whose opinion is a binary variable. At each time step, an agent along with a social neighbor is selected and the agent imitates the social neighbor at the next time step. In this paper, we study a…
Concurrent game frames are a standard semantic framework for logics of strategic reasoning. Two notions of coalition power can be derived from such frames: alpha powers and actual powers. An alpha power of a coalition is a set of possible…
Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some…
We study a mixed population of adaptive agents with small and large memories, competing in a minority game. If the agents are sufficiently adaptive, we find that the average winnings per agent can exceed that obtainable in the corresponding…
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where…
A new class of general exponential ranking models is introduced which we label angle-based models for ranking data. A consensus score vector is assumed, which assigns scores to a set of items, where the scores reflect a consensus view of…
Estimators based on influence functions (IFs) have been shown to be effective in many settings, especially when combined with machine learning techniques. By focusing on estimating a specific target of interest (e.g., the average effect of…
In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a…
We study inference with a small labeled sample, a large unlabeled sample, and high-quality predictions from an external model. We link prediction-powered inference with empirical likelihood by stacking supervised estimating equations based…
This paper presents a universal representation of symmetric (permutation-invariant) functions with multidimensional variable-size variables. These representations help justify approximation methods that aggregate information from each…
If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel postulate. However, we prove that certain types of quarrel…
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
The aim of this paper is to study the asymptotic behavior of strongly reinforced interacting urns with partial memory sharing. The reinforcement mechanism considered is as follows: draw at each step and for each urn a white or black ball…
We investigate a variation of the classical voter model in which the set of influencing agents depends on an individual's current opinion. The initial population consists of a random sample of equally sized sub-populations for each state,…
This paper reframes approachability theory within the context of population games. Thus, whilst one player aims at driving her average payoff to a predefined set, her opponent is not malevolent but rather extracted randomly from a…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
We study a model of electoral accountability and selection whereby heterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data into personalized signals through paying limited attention. Extreme voters' signals exhibit an…
The form and justification of inductive inference rules depend strongly on the representation of uncertainty. This paper examines one generic representation, namely, incomplete information. The notion can be formalized by presuming that the…
We highlight that match fixed effects, represented by the coefficients of interaction terms involving dummy variables for two elements, lack identification without specific restrictions on parameters. Consequently, the coefficients…