Related papers: The Two-envelope Problem: An Informed Choice
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et…
We introduce the competitive assignment problem, a two-player version of the well-known assignment problem. Given a set of tasks and a set of agents with different efficiencies for different tasks, Alice and Bob take turns picking agents…
In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…
We can usually assume others have goals analogous to our own. This assumption can also, at times, be applied to multi-agent games - e.g. Agent 1's attraction to green pellets is analogous to Agent 2's attraction to red pellets. This…
Collaborative decision making in multi-agent systems typically requires a predefined communication protocol among agents. Usually, agent-level observations are locally processed and information is exchanged using the predefined protocol,…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…
Sequences of repeated gambles provide an experimental tool to characterize the risk preferences of humans or artificial decision-making agents. The difficulty of this inference depends on factors including the details of the gambles offered…
This paper presents research comparing the effects of different environments on the outcome of an extended Prisoner's Dilemma, in which agents have the option to abstain from playing the game. We consider three different pure strategies:…
Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-player competitive resource allocation models. We consider…
We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium…
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Any strategy and prior probability together are a coherent conditional probability that can be extended, generally not in a unique way, to a full conditional probability. The corresponding class of extensions is studied and a closed form…
Using results from neurobiology on perceptual decision making and value-based decision making, the problem of decision making between lotteries is reformulated in an abstract space where uncertain prospects are mapped to corresponding…
It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems…
Two agents repeatedly compete for the power to set policy. A principal partially influences the power allocation. All three players may disagree on policy, but one agent (the ``friend'') aligns more closely with the principal than the other…
We apply a Bayesian agent-based framework inspired by QBism to iterations of two quantum games, the CHSH game and the quantum prisoners' dilemma. In each two-player game, players hold beliefs about an amount of shared entanglement and about…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…