Related papers: Computational Extensive-Form Games
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
A major open question in algorithmic game theory is whether normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCE) can be computed efficiently in succinct games such as extensive-form games [DFF+25,6PR24,FP23,HvS08,VSF08,PR08]. Motivated by this…
We consider the problem of a game theorist analyzing a game that uses cryptographic protocols. Ideally, a theorist abstracts protocols as ideal, implementation-independent primitives, letting conclusions in the "ideal world" carry over to…
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In these games players proceed in turns having, at each stage, finitely many moves to their disposal, each play always ends, and in each play the…
In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with capacities, restricting flow rates.…
The paper is concerned with distributed learning in large-scale games. The well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm is addressed, which, despite theoretical convergence results, might be impractical to implement in large-scale settings due…
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case of a quantifier and that our more…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…
The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
This letter reports a novel application of game theory to quantum informational processes which can be used to optimally classify data generated by these processes. To this end, the notion of simultaneously distinguishing a pure quantum…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
We suggest to look at quantum measurement outcomes not through the lens of probability theory, but instead through decision theory. We introduce an original game-theoretical framework, model and algorithmic procedure where measurement…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
Stochastic differential games have been used extensively to model agents' competitions in Finance, for instance, in P2P lending platforms from the Fintech industry, the banking system for systemic risk, and insurance markets. The recently…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…