Related papers: An Iterative On-Line Mechanism for Demand-Side Agg…

This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…

We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and…

This paper studies a wireless network where multiple users cooperate with each other to improve the overall network performance. Our goal is to design an optimal distributed power allocation algorithm that enables user cooperation, in…

We present novel online mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions in which users bid for priority service. We assume that users at the front of their lane are requested to declare their delay cost, i.e. value of time, and that users are…

This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows…

Simultaneous item auctions are simple procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences over different item sets. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation…

Future electricity distribution grids will host a considerable share of the renewable energy sources needed for enforcing the energy transition. Demand side management mechanisms play a key role in the integration of such renewable energy…

The system operator's scheduling problem in electricity markets, called unit commitment, is a non-convex mixed-integer program. The optimal value function is non-convex, preventing the application of traditional marginal pricing theory to…

Motivated by the use of high speed circuit switches in large scale data centers, we consider the problem of circuit switch scheduling. In this problem we are given demands between pairs of servers and the goal is to schedule at every time…

We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…

Timely resource allocation in edge-assisted vehicular networks is essential for compute-intensive services such as autonomous driving and navigation. However, vehicle mobility leads to spatio-temporal unpredictability of resource demands,…

Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints (by which the demands for certain goods are limited by the corresponding supplies). The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized…

An important part of the Smart Grid literature on residential Demand Response deals with game-theoretic consumption models. Among those papers, the hourly billing model is of special interest as an intuitive and fair mechanism. We focus on…

We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentially overlapping GAI clusters of attributes, thus decreases…

We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural no-overbidding assumption: the buyers do not bid above their…

We consider the problem of forecasting the aggregate demand of a pool of price-responsive consumers of electricity. The price-response of the aggregation is modeled by an optimization problem that is characterized by a set of marginal…

Many advertisers buy advertisements (ads) on the Internet or on traditional media and seek simple, online mechanisms to reserve ad slots in advance. Media publishers represent a vast and varying inventory, and they too seek automatic,…

In this paper, we propose a distributed control strategy for the design of an energy market. The method relies on a hierarchical structure of aggregators for the coordination of prosumers (agents which can produce and consume energy). The…

We present a machine learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction (MLCA). The main goal of integrating machine learning (ML) into the auction is to improve preference elicitation, which is a major challenge in large combinatorial…

A coordinated trading process is proposed as a design for an electricity market with significant uncertainty, perhaps from renewables. In this process, groups of agents propose to the system operator (SO) a contingent buy and sell trade…