Related papers: Group buying with bundle discounts: computing effi…
We study the dynamic pricing problem faced by a monopolistic retailer who sells a storable product to forward-looking consumers. In this framework, the two major pricing policies (or mechanisms) studied in the literature are the…
A distributed, hierarchical, market based approach is introduced to solve the economic dispatch problem. The approach requires only a minimal amount of information to be shared between a central market operator and the end-users. Price…
In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the…
Assortment optimization is a critical tool for online retailers aiming to maximize revenue. However, optimizing purely for revenue can lead to unbalanced sales across products, potentially causing a long tail of low-selling products and…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
This work studies equilibrium problems under uncertainty where firms maximize their profits in a robust way when selling their output. Robust optimization plays an increasingly important role when best guaranteed objective values are to be…
Computing market equilibria is a problem of both theoretical and applied interest. Much research to date focuses on the case of static Fisher markets with full information on buyers' utility functions and item supplies. Motivated by…
We study an assortment optimization problem under a multi-purchase choice model in which customers choose a bundle of up to one product from each of two product categories. Different bundles have different utilities and the bundle price is…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
Bundling, the practice of jointly selling two or more products at a discount, is a widely used strategy in industry and a well examined concept in academia. Historically, the focus has been on theoretical studies in the context of…
In strategic classification, agents manipulate their features, at a cost, to receive a positive classification outcome from the learner's classifier. The goal of the learner in such settings is to learn a classifier that is robust to…
We study online resource allocation in a cloud computing platform, through a posted pricing mechanism: The cloud provider publishes a unit price for each resource type, which may vary over time; upon arrival at the cloud system, a cloud…
The role of a market maker is to simultaneously offer to buy and sell quantities of goods, often a financial asset such as a share, at specified prices. An automated market maker (AMM) is a mechanism that offers to trade according to some…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…
We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an…
We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values for the…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
This paper studies how to aggregate prosumers (or large consumers) and their collective decisions in electricity markets, with a focus on fairness. Fairness is essential for prosumers to participate in aggregation schemes. Some prosumers…