Related papers: Characterisation of Strongly Stable Matchings
We study the oblivious matching problem, which aims at finding a maximum matching on a graph with unknown edge set. Any algorithm for the problem specifies an ordering of the vertex pairs. The matching is then produced by probing the pairs…
The stable allocation problem is one of the broadest extensions of the well-known stable marriage problem. In an allocation problem, edges of a bipartite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case…
Let $G=(U \cup V, E)$ be a bipartite graph, where $U$ represents jobs and $V$ represents machines. We study a new variant of the bipartite matching problem in which each job in $U$ can be matched to at most one machine in $V$, and the…
Let G = (V, E) be a directed acyclic graph with two distinguished vertices s, t and let F be a set of forbidden pairs of vertices. We say that a path in G is safe, if it contains at most one vertex from each pair {u, v} in F. Given G and F,…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
In this paper, we consider the communication complexity of protocols that compute stable matchings. We work within the context of Gale and Shapley's original stable marriage problem\cite{GS62}: $n$ men and $n$ women each privately hold a…
We consider the problem of finding all allowed edges in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$, i.e., all edges that are included in some maximum matching. We show that given any maximum matching in the graph, it is possible to perform this…
Stable flows generalize the well-known concept of stable matchings to markets in which transactions may involve several agents, forwarding flow from one to another. An instance of the problem consists of a capacitated directed network, in…
An Orthogonally resolvable Matching Design OMD$(n, k)$ is a partition of the edges the complete graph $K_n$ into matchings of size $k$, called blocks, such that the blocks can be resolved in two different ways. Such a design can be…
We present a polynomial-time $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching in a many-to-many matching model with ties and laminar constraints on both sides. We formulate our problem…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
We initiate the study of the Diverse Pair of (Maximum/ Perfect) Matchings problems which given a graph $G$ and an integer $k$, ask whether $G$ has two (maximum/perfect) matchings whose symmetric difference is at least $k$. Diverse Pair of…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
Motivated by a wide range of assemble-to-order systems and systems of the collaborative economy applications, we introduce a stochastic matching model on hypergraphs and multigraphs, extending the model introduced by Mairesse and Moyal…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
Given a bipartite graph, where the two sets of vertices are applicants and posts and ranks on the edges represent preferences of applicants over posts, a {\em rank-maximal} matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is…
An $(s,t)$-matching in a bipartite graph $G=(U,V,E)$ is a subset of the edges $F$ such that each component of $G[F]$ is a tree with at most $t$ edges and each vertex in $U$ has $s$ neighbours in $G[H]$. We give sharp conditions for a…
In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be…
Intuitively speaking, a bipartite graph is mirror if it can be drawn in the Cartesian plane in such a way that, the vertices of one stable are points in x=0, the vertices of the other stable set are points in x=1, the edges are straight…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…