Related papers: Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Ea…
The paper addresses aggregation issues for composite (modular) solutions. A systemic view point is suggested for various aggregation problems. Several solution structures are considered: sets, set morphologies, trees, etc. Mainly, the…
We study the dynamics of the nonlinear $q$-voter model with inflexible zealots in a finite well-mixed population. In this system, each individual supports one of two parties and is either a susceptible voter or an inflexible zealot. At each…
This study considers the method to derive a ranking of alternatives by aggregating the rankings submitted by several individuals who may not evaluate all of them. The collection of subsets of alternatives that individuals (can) evaluate is…
Consider a committee election consisting of (i) a set of candidates who are divided into arbitrary groups each of size ${at~most}$ two and a diversity constraint that stipulates the selection of ${at~least}$ one candidate from each group…
Consider a distributed graph where each vertex holds one of two distinct opinions. In this paper, we are interested in synchronous voting processes where each vertex updates its opinion according to a predefined common local updating rule.…
In a crowd forecasting system, aggregation is an algorithm that returns aggregated probabilities for each question based on the probabilities provided per question by each individual in the crowd. Various aggregation methods have been…
Online social platforms increasingly rely on crowd-sourced systems to label misleading content at scale, but these systems must both aggregate users' evaluations and decide whose evaluations to trust. To address the latter, many platforms…
Traditionally, the problem of apportioning the seats of a legislative body has been viewed as a one-shot process with no dynamic considerations. While this approach is reasonable for some settings, dynamic aspects play an important role in…
We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. The goal is to…
This paper is concerned with the problem of controlling a system of constrained dynamic subsystems in a way that balances the performance degradation of decentralized control with the practical cost of centralized control. We propose a…
Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look…
A canonical problem in social choice is how to aggregate ranked votes: given $n$ voters' rankings over $m$ candidates, what voting rule $f$ should we use to aggregate these votes into a single winner? One standard method for comparing…
Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random…
Democratic societies are built around the principle of free and fair elections, that each citizen's vote should count equal. National elections can be regarded as large-scale social experiments, where people are grouped into usually large…
We give efficient "collaboration protocols" through which two parties, who observe different features about the same instances, can interact to arrive at predictions that are more accurate than either could have obtained on their own. The…
Multi-winner approval elections are seen in a variety of settings ranging from academic societies and associations to public elections. In such elections, it is often the case that ballot-length restrictions are enforced; that is, where…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…