Related papers: Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Ea…
Arrow's Theorem concerns a fundamental problem in social choice theory: given the individual preferences of members of a group, how can they be aggregated to form rational group preferences? Arrow showed that in an election between three or…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
We consider the problem of information aggregation in federated decision making, where a group of agents collaborate to infer the underlying state of nature without sharing their private data with the central processor or each other. We…
We address the issue of the reducibility of the dynamics on a multilayer network to an equivalent process on an aggregated single-layer network. As a typical example of models for opinion formation in social networks, we implement the voter…
Federated Learning (FL) permits different parties to collaboratively train a global model without disclosing their respective local labels. A crucial step of FL, that of aggregating local models to produce the global one, shares many…
This work examines the Conditional Approval Framework for elections involving multiple interdependent issues, specifically focusing on the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule. We first conduct a detailed analysis of the computational…
We investigate efficient ways for the incorporation of liquid democracy into election settings in which voters submit cumulative ballots, i.e., when each voter is assigned a virtual coin that she can then distribute as she wishes among the…
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…
Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…
The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich…
A general challenge in statistics is prediction in the presence of multiple candidate models or learning algorithms. Model aggregation tries to combine all predictive distributions from individual models, which is more stable and flexible…
Dokow and Holzman determined which predicates over $\{0, 1\}$ satisfy an analog of Arrow's theorem: all unanimous aggregators are dictatorial. Szegedy and Xu, extending earlier work of Dokow and Holzman, extended this to predicates over…
In this paper, we consider lightweight decentralised algorithms for achieving consensus in distributed systems. Each member of a distributed group has a private value from a fixed set consisting of, say, two elements, and the goal is for…
We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…
Formal argumentation is being used increasingly in artificial intelligence as an effective and understandable way to model potentially conflicting pieces of information, called arguments, and identify so-called acceptable arguments…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
Many times the nodes of a complex network, whether deliberately or not, are aggregated for technical, ethical, legal limitations or privacy reasons. A common example is the geographic position: one may uncover communities in a network of…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
We study opinion evolution in networks of stubborn agents discussing a sequence of issues, modeled through the so called concatenated Friedkin-Johnsen (FJ) model. It is concatenated in the sense that agents' opinions evolve for each issue,…