Related papers: Does good memory help you win games?
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…
Inspired by the cognitive science theory of the explicit human memory systems, we have modeled an agent with short-term, episodic, and semantic memory systems, each of which is modeled with a knowledge graph. To evaluate this system and…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
In the frustrated interaction systems, the nature of ordered configuration can be intrinsically temperature dependent. There, the idea of effective coupling of decorated and frustrated bond plays an important role. The idea of effective…
Experience replay is a key technique behind many recent advances in deep reinforcement learning. Allowing the agent to learn from earlier memories can speed up learning and break undesirable temporal correlations. Despite its wide-spread…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
Extensive-form games constitute the standard representation scheme for games with a temporal component. But do all extensive-form games correspond to protocols that we can implement in the real world? We often rule out games with imperfect…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…
We propose a simple model that describes the dynamics of efficiencies of competing agents. Agents communicate leading to increase of efficiencies of underachievers, and an efficiency of each agent can increase or decrease irrespectively of…
The behaviour of multi-agent learning in many player games has been shown to display complex dynamics outside of restrictive examples such as network zero-sum games. In addition, it has been shown that convergent behaviour is less likely to…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
We present the effect of mergers in the dynamics of the three-agent model studied by Ben-Naim, Kahng and Kim and by Rador and Mungan. Mergers are possible in three-agent games because two agents can combine forces against the third player…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or recommendations. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The…
We study a game where households convert paper assets, such as money, into consumption goods, to preempt inflation. The game features a unique equilibrium with high (low) inflation, if money supply is high (low). For intermediate levels of…
We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the opponent in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. We provide a necessary condition for…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
We investigate opinion dynamics in a fully-connected system, consisting of $n$ identical and anonymous agents, where one of the opinions (which is called correct) represents a piece of information to disseminate. In more detail, one source…
The strategies adopted by individuals to select relevant information to pass on are central to understanding problem solving by groups. Here we use agent-based simulations to revisit a cooperative problem-solving scenario where the task is…