Related papers: An $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium with high probabili…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only…
We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls the rate of arrivals and departures associated with…
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…
Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…
We consider a dynamic model of traffic that has received a lot of attention in the past few years. Infinitesimally small agents aim to travel from a source to a destination as quickly as possible. Flow patterns vary over time, and…
We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/$1$ queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in…
We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…
We consider a queuing network that opens at a specified time, where customers are non-atomic and belong to different classes. Each class has its own route, and as is typical in the literature, the costs are a linear function of waiting and…
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…
We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We study the Nash equilibrium profile among customers, and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
Arrival processes to service systems often display fluctuations that are larger than anticipated under the Poisson assumption, a phenomenon that is referred to as overdispersion. Motivated by this, we analyze a class of discrete stochastic…
Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…