Related papers: Structure in Dichotomous Preferences
In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of the…
A multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper. The model includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector criterion, and n preference relations of the decision makers (DMs). Each preference relation is a cone relation…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped. Our main interest is the existence of…
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show…
Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…
This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of…
This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…
In economics and social choice single-peakedness is one of the most important and commonly studied models for preferences. It is well known that single-peaked consistency for total orders is in P. However in practice a preference profile is…
Social choice has become a foundational component of modern machine learning systems. From auctions and resource allocation to the alignment of large generative models, machine learning pipelines increasingly aggregate heterogeneous…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…
Distributed linguistic representations are powerful tools for modelling the uncertainty and complexity of preference information in linguistic decision making. To provide a comprehensive perspective on the development of distributed…
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
Recent cross-domain recommendation (CDR) studies assume that disentangled domain-shared and domain-specific user representations can mitigate domain gaps and facilitate effective knowledge transfer. However, achieving perfect…
A structure called a decision making problem is considered. The set of outcomes (consequences) is partially ordered according to the decision maker's preferences. The problem is how these preferences affect a decision maker to prefer one of…
We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are…
Given the stated preferences of several people over a number of proposals regarding public policy initiatives, some of those proposals might be judged to be more ``divisive'' than others. When designing online participatory platforms to…
We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully proportional representation rules---Chamberlin--Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be…