Related papers: Efficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Ga…

The $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed…

In this article we compute analytically the number of Nash Equilibria (NE) for a two-choice game played on a (circular) ladder graph with $2n$ players. We consider a set of games with generic payoff parameters, with the only requirement…

We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…

This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…

We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…

The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…

We study symmetric bimatrix games that also have the common-payoff property, i.e., the two players receive the same payoff at any outcome of the game. Due to the symmetry property, these games are guaranteed to have symmetric Nash…

One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with…

We present a new methodology for computing approximate Nash equilibria for two-person non-cooperative games based upon certain extensions and specializations of an existing optimization approach previously used for the derivation of fixed…

Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payo s) is…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…

In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these…

Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…

We consider the capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game with binary preferences, over general undirected networks. We first show that such games have an associated ordinary potential function, and hence always admit a pure-strategy Nash…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…