Related papers: Social Learning with Endogenous Network Formation

We describe a Bayesian model for social learning of a random variable in which agents might observe each other over a directed network. The outcomes produced are compared to those from a model in which observations occur randomly over a…

We consider the problem of distributed hypothesis testing (or social learning) where a network of agents seeks to identify the true state of the world from a finite set of hypotheses, based on a series of stochastic signals that each agent…

We study a social learning scheme where at every time instant, each agent chooses to receive information from one of its neighbors at random. We show that under this sparser communication scheme, the agents learn the truth eventually and…

We address the problem of reinforcement learning in which observations may exhibit an arbitrary form of stochastic dependence on past observations and actions, i.e. environments more general than (PO)MDPs. The task for an agent is to attain…

We study a model of learning on social networks in dynamic environments, describing a group of agents who are each trying to estimate an underlying state that varies over time, given access to weak signals and the estimates of their social…

We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown underlying binary state of the world. Each agent, prior to making a decision, receives an independent private signal whose distribution depends…

This paper presents a social learning model where the network structure is endogenously determined by signal precision and dimension choices. Agents not only choose the precision of their signals and what dimension of the state to learn…

We consider a group of agents who can each take an irreversible costly action whose payoff depends on an unknown state. Agents learn about the state from private signals, as well as from past actions of their social network neighbors, which…

I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state. A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high…

Consider a network of agents that all want to guess the correct value of some ground truth state. In a sequential order, each agent makes its decision using a single private signal which has a constant probability of error, as well as…

Maximizing long-term rewards is the primary goal in sequential decision-making problems. The majority of existing methods assume that side information is freely available, enabling the learning agent to observe all features' states before…

We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals, and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social…

Observational learning often involves congestion: an agent gets lower payoff from an action when more predecessors have taken that action. This preference to act differently from previous agents may paradoxically increase all but one…

We conduct a sequential social-learning experiment where subjects each guess a hidden state based on private signals and the guesses of a subset of their predecessors. A network determines the observable predecessors, and we compare…

Social learning, a fundamental process through which individuals shape their beliefs and perspectives via observation and interaction with others, is critical for the development of our society and the functioning of social governance.…

In settings like vaccination registries, individuals act after observing others, and the resulting public records can expose private information. We study privacy-preserving sequential learning, where agents add endogenous noise to their…

We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At…

Social learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which must crucially depend on the mechanisms of social interaction. Consumers choosing which product to buy, or voters deciding which option to…

We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors' actions, chooses whether to acquire a private signal (and its precision), and then…

When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…