Related papers: Large Supports are required for Well-Supported Nas…
Signaling game problems investigate communication scenarios where encoder(s) and decoder(s) have misaligned objectives due to the fact that they either employ different cost functions or have inconsistent priors. This problem has been…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…
We prove that there exists a constant $\epsilon>0$ such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (nXn) game requires quasi-polynomial time,…
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…
The recent theory of sequential games and selection functions by Mar- tin Escardo and Paulo Oliva is extended to games in which players move simultaneously. The Nash existence theorem for mixed-strategy equilibria of finite games is…
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…
We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…
In this report, some properties of the set of Nash equilibria (NEs) of $2 \times 2$ zero-sum games are reviewed. In particular, the cardinality of the set of NEs is given in terms of the entries of the payoff matrix. Moreover, closed-form…
Quantum game theory has emerged as a promising candidate to further the understanding of quantum correlations. Motivated by this, it is demonstrated that pure strategy Nash equilibria can be utilised as a mechanism to witness and determine…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textbook. Using labeled "best-response polytopes", we present the…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…
We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…