Related papers: Welfare Maximization with Limited Interaction
Many real-life settings of consumer-choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover-effects. This paper develops novel empirical tools for analyzing demand and welfare-effects of policy-interventions in…
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a $.743$-fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' values are independently distributed. The previous best bound was…
Designing individualized allocation of treatments so as to maximize the equilibrium welfare of interacting agents has many policy-relevant applications. Focusing on sequential decision games of interacting agents, this paper develops a…
We study inference on the optimal welfare in a policy learning problem and propose reporting a lower confidence band (LCB). A natural approach to constructing an LCB is to invert a one-sided t-test based on an efficient estimator for the…
The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primary mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is known to output a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes…
We study an optimal wage band problem in a competitive matching labor market where education signals worker ability. We prove uniqueness of the competitive signaling equilibrium under a general class of utility and profit functions and show…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the \emph{liquid welfare}, a notion of efficiency for…
Theoreticians have studied distributed algorithms in the radio network model for close to three decades. A significant fraction of this work focuses on lower bounds for basic communication problems such as wake-up (symmetry breaking among…
In this paper, we investigate the problem of decentralized consensus optimization over directed graphs with limited communication bandwidth. We introduce a novel decentralized optimization algorithm that combines the Reduced Consensus…
We consider the problem of welfare maximization in two-sided markets using simple mechanisms that are prior-independent. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that even for bilateral trade, there is no feasible (IR,…
Given a graph $G$, a community structure $\mathcal{C}$, and a budget $k$, the fair influence maximization problem aims to select a seed set $S$ ($|S|\leq k$) that maximizes the influence spread while narrowing the influence gap between…
We study optimal distributed first-order optimization algorithms when the network (i.e., communication constraints between the agents) changes with time. This problem is motivated by scenarios where agents experience network malfunctions.…
Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore how the welfare outcomes of a coordination game depend on…
Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be…
In this paper we study the optimal formation control of multiple agents whose interaction parameters are adjusted upon a cost function consisting of both the control energy and the geometrical performance. By optimizing the interaction…
Distributed optimization increasingly plays a central role in economical and sustainable operation of cyber-physical systems. Nevertheless, the complete potential of the technology has not yet been fully exploited in practice due to…
We study the welfare structure in two-sided large random matching markets. In the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her preferences follow a logit model based on these scores.…
An overarching issue in resource management of wireless networks is assessing their capacity: How much communication can be achieved in a network, utilizing all the tools available: power control, scheduling, routing, channel assignment and…
This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers participate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but not both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted total surplus,…