Related papers: Watch and Learn: Optimizing from Revealed Preferen…

In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all…

We study games in which a leader makes a single commitment, and then multiple followers (each with a different utility function) respond. In particular, we study ambiguous commitment strategies in these games, in which the leader may commit…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies…

We consider multiple access games in which primary users are interested in maximizing their confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and secondary users employ eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize their data rate…

Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…

The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learning algorithms naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic interpretation. We adopt this viewpoint and model the actor and critic interaction…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for…

In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…

In order to balance the interests of integrated energy operator (IEO) and users, a novel Stackelberg game-based optimization framework is proposed for the optimal scheduling of integrated demand response (IDR)-enabled integrated energy…

This paper considers a multi-user single-relay wireless network, where the relay gets paid for helping the users forward signals, and the users pay to receive the relay service. We study the relay power allocation and pricing problems, and…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…

Goods can exhibit positive externalities impacting decisions of customers in socials networks. Suppliers can integrate these externalities in their pricing strategies to increase their revenue. Besides optimizing the prize, suppliers also…

In this paper, an incentive proactive cache mechanism in cache-enabled small cell networks (SCNs) is proposed, in order to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in the caching procedure. A network composed of a single mobile…

Governments are motivated to subsidize profit-driven firms that manufacture zero-emission vehicles to ensure they become price-competitive. This paper introduces a dynamic Stackelberg game to determine the government's optimal subsidy…

We study reputation formation where a long-run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short-run players observe the long-run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long-run player can thus develop a…

The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker.…

We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be…

The prisoner's dilemma game is the most known contribution of game theory into social sciences. Here we describe new implications of this game for transactional and transformative leadership. While the autocratic (Stackelberg's) leadership…