Related papers: Sorting in Networks: Adversity and Structure

We consider a group of agents who can each take an irreversible costly action whose payoff depends on an unknown state. Agents learn about the state from private signals, as well as from past actions of their social network neighbors, which…

This work introduces two strategies for training network classifiers with heterogeneous agents. One strategy promotes global smoothing over the graph and a second strategy promotes local smoothing over neighbourhoods. It is assumed that the…

We study very simple sorting algorithms based on a probabilistic comparator model. In our model, errors in comparing two elements are due to (1) the energy or effort put in the comparison and (2) the difference between the compared…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

With the growing popularity of mobile smart devices, the existing networks are unable to meet the requirement of many complex scenarios; current network architectures and protocols do not work well with the network with high latency and…

Humans and other animals often follow the decisions made by others because these are indicative of the quality of possible choices, resulting in `social response rules': observed relationships between the probability that an agent will make…

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…

In social recommender systems, it is crucial that the recommendation models provide equitable visibility for different demographic groups, such as gender or race. Most existing research has addressed this problem by only studying individual…

We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…

Agents learn about a changing state using private signals and their neighbors' past estimates of the state. We present a model in which Bayesian agents in equilibrium use neighbors' estimates simply by taking weighted sums with…

When ranking big data observations such as colleges in the United States, diverse consumers reveal heterogeneous preferences. The objective of this paper is to sort out a linear ordering for these observations and to recommend strategies to…

In social dilemmas, most interactions are transient and susceptible to restructuring, leading to continuous changes in social networks over time. Typically, agents assess the rewards of their current interactions and adjust their…

Collaboration networks are studied as an example of growing bipartite networks. These have been previously observed to have structure such as positive correlations between nearest-neighbour degrees. However, a detailed understanding of the…

We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…

The friendship paradox states that, on average, our friends have more friends than we do. In network terms, the average degree over the nodes can never exceed the average degree over the neighbours of nodes. This effect, which is a classic…

The occurrence of discrimination is an important problem in the social and economical sciences. Much of the discrimination observed in empirical studies can be explained by the theory of in-group favoritism, which states that people tend to…

Here we consider the communications tactics appropriate for a group of agents that need to "swarm" together in a highly adversarial environment. Specfically, whilst they need to cooperate by exchanging information with each other about…

Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…

We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…