Related papers: Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for…

In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…

This article reviews the recent advances in the uniqueness and multiplicity of competitive equilibria in models arising in mathematical economics, finance, macroeconomics, and trade.

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…

We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and indivisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et…

There is increasing attention to evaluating the fairness of search system ranking decisions. These metrics often consider the membership of items to particular groups, often identified using protected attributes such as gender or ethnicity.…

We study fair resource allocation when the resources contain a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods, focusing on the well-studied fairness notion of maximin share fairness (MMS). With only indivisible goods, a full MMS allocation may…

We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional…

In an online fair allocation problem, a sequence of indivisible items arrives online and needs to be allocated to offline agents immediately and irrevocably. In our paper, we study the online allocation of either goods or chores. We employ…

We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…

In this work we introduce a new class of mechanisms composed of a traditional Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction and a fair division scheme, in order to achieve some desired level of fairness between groups of Bayesian strategic…

We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible chores under additive valuations. We assume that the chores are divided into two types and under this scenario, we present several results. Our first result is a new characterization…

A review of the main fairness definitions and fair learning methodologies proposed in the literature over the last years is presented from a mathematical point of view. Following our independence-based approach, we consider how to build…

We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading…

We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions of fairness, less is known about the…

In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the…

We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the groups in a fair manner. We show that for any number of…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…