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Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an…

We study a general setting of neutral evolution in which the population is of finite, constant size and can have spatial structure. Mutation leads to different genetic types ("traits"), which can be discrete or continuous. Under minimal…

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…

Rock-paper-scissors games metaphorically model cyclic dominance in ecology and microbiology. In a static environment, these models are characterized by fixation probabilities obeying two different "laws" in large and small well-mixed…

The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…

The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…

We propose a control-theoretic framework for evolutionary clustering based on Mean Field Games (MFG). Moving beyond static or heuristic approaches, we formulate the problem as a population dynamics game governed by a coupled…

One of the most striking effect of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory is the possibility for mutants to fixate (take over) an entire population. Here, we generalize a recent WKB-based theory to study fixation in evolutionary games…

Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…

Evolutionary game theory, encompassing discrete, continuous, and mixed strategies, is pivotal for understanding cooperation dynamics. Discrete strategies involve deterministic actions with a fixed probability of one, whereas continuous…

The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…

We introduce a deterministic analogue of Markov chains that we call the hunger game. Like rotor-routing, the hunger game deterministically mimics the behavior of both recurrent Markov chains and absorbing Markov chains. In the case of…

People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient…

We study fixation in large, but finite, populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation…

We consider a model for Darwinian evolution in an asexual population with a large but non-constant populations size characterized by a natural birth rate, a logistic death rate modelling competition and a probability of mutation at each…

Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal multiple access channels by considering a continuous non-cooperative game whose strategy space represents the users' distribution of transmission power over the network's…

We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…