Related papers: Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in…
Population structure can have a significant effect on evolution. For some systems with sufficient symmetry, analytic results can be derived within the mathematical framework of evolutionary graph theory which relate to the outcome of the…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation where a game's payoff entries are random variables. Using the replicator-mutator equations, we…
We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning…
Understanding if and how mutants reach fixation in populations is an important question in evolutionary biology. We study the impact of population growth has on the success of mutants. To systematically understand the effects of growth we…
To investigate the origin of cooperative behaviors, we developed an evolutionary model of sequential strategies and tested our model with computer simulations. The sequential strategies represented by stochastic machines were evaluated…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
We consider the evolution of populations under the joint action of mutation and differential reproduction, or selection. The population is modelled as a finite-type Markov branching process in continuous time, and the associated…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
In this paper we study a class of stochastic individual-based models that describe the evolution of haploid populations where each individual is characterised by a phenotype and a genotype. The phenotype of an individual determines its…
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called `stochastic slowdown' effect, previously observed in (Altrock et. al, 2010) for simple evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly-heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult…
In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
Coevolving and competing species or game-theoretic strategies exhibit rich and complex dynamics for which a general theoretical framework based on finite populations is still lacking. Recently, an explicit mean-field description in the form…