Related papers: On the Complexity of Exchanging

We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…

We study the computational complexity of controlling the result of an election by breaking ties strategically. This problem is equivalent to the problem of deciding the winner of an election under parallel universes tie-breaking. When the…

We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…

An important aspect in systems of multiple autonomous agents is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. In this paper, we solve various open problems concerning the computational complexity of stable partitions in additively…

This paper models games where the strategies are nodes of a graph G (we denote them as G-games) and in presence of coalition structures. The cases of one-shot and repeated games are presented. In the latter situation, coalitions are assumed…

We investigate certain word-construction games with variable turn orders. In these games, Alice and Bob take turns on choosing consecutive letters of a word of fixed length, with Alice winning if the result lies in a predetermined target…

We give a broad survey of recent results in Enumerative Combinatorics and their complexity aspects.

Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…

Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a finite carrier)…

In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in multi-player symmetric games. For two-player games, deciding existence of an ESS is complete for {\Sigma} 2 , the second level of the…

Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…

There are many papers written on the Two Envelopes Problem that usually study some of its variations. In this paper we will study and compare the most significant variations of the problem. We will see the correct decisions for each player…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

We introduce the concept of an {\em operator decision making technique} and apply it to a concrete political problem: should a given political party form a coalition or not? We focus on the situation of three political parties, and divide…

We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…

The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…

Concurrent games with a fixed number of agents have been thoroughly studied, with various solution concepts and objectives for the agents. In this paper, we consider concurrent games with an arbitrary number of agents, and study the problem…

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…

We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…

This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and distributed merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed. This…