Related papers: Consequences of a Goedel's misjudgment
Although the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable, the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can be apply to it is fairly common. Furthermore, the so-called "essential" (or "inherent") semantic incompleteness of the…
I present the proof of Goedel's First Incompleteness theorem in an intuitive manner, while covering all technically challenging steps. I present generalizations of Goedel's fixed point lemma to two-sentence and multi-sentence versions,…
After highlighting the cases in which the semantics of a language cannot be mechanically reproduced (in which case it is called inherent), the main epistemological consequences of the first incompleteness Theorem for the two fundamental…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
Goedel's completeness theorem is concerned with provability, while Girard's theorem in ludics (as well as full completeness theorems in game semantics) are concerned with proofs. Our purpose is to look for a connection between these two…
The literature dealing with G\"{o}del's legacy is largely preoccupied with challenging his philosophical views, regarding them as outdated. We believe that such an approach prevents us from seeing G\"{o}del's views in the right light and…
Some common fallacies about fundamental themes of Logic are exposed: the First and Second incompleteness Theorem interpretations, Chaitin's various superficialities and the usual classification of the axiomatic Theories in function of its…
The inconsistencies involved in the foundation of set theory were invariably caused by infinity and self-reference; and only with the opportune axiomatic restrictions could them be obviated. Throughout history, both concepts have proved to…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
It is argued that Goedel's incompleteness theorem should be seen as self-evident, rather than unexpected or surprising.
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general,…
A new computational method that uses polynomial equations and dynamical systems to evaluate logical propositions is introduced and applied to Goedel's incompleteness theorems. The truth value of a logical formula subject to a set of axioms…
We give a reframing of Godel's first and second incompleteness theorems that applies even to some undefinable theories of arithmetic. The usual Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions and the diagonal lemma are replaced by a more direct…
In this article we discuss the proof in the short unpublished paper appeared in the 3rd volume of Godel's Collected Works entitled "On undecidable sentences" (*1931?), which provides an introduction to Godel's 1931 ideas regarding the…
We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…
The overarching theme of the following pages is that mathematical logic -- centered around the incompleteness theorems -- is first and foremost an investigation of $\textit{computation}$, not arithmetic. Guided by this intuition we will…