Related papers: Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
To study discrimination in automated decision-making systems, scholars have proposed several definitions of fairness, each expressing a different fair ideal. These definitions require practitioners to make complex decisions regarding which…
To support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction, we proposes an exact and two heuristic strategies for bidding on subsets of requests. The exact bidding strategy is based on the concept of elementary request combinations.…
We consider the problem of the optimization of bidding strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions, when the seller fixes the reserve prices based on the bid distributions. Our study is done in the setting where one bidder is…
This article aims to introduce the paradigm of distributional robustness from the field of convex optimization to tackle optimal design problems under uncertainty. We consider realistic situations where the physical model, and thereby the…
In recent years, two prominent paradigms have shaped distributionally robust optimization (DRO), modeling distributional ambiguity through $\phi$-divergences and Wasserstein distances, respectively. While the former focuses on ambiguity in…
We study multi-marginal optimal transport problems from a probabilistic graphical model perspective. We point out an elegant connection between the two when the underlying cost for optimal transport allows a graph structure. In particular,…
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We establish dual attainment for the multimarginal, multi-asset martingale optimal transport (MOT) problem, a fundamental question in the mathematical theory of model-independent pricing and hedging in quantitative finance. Our main result…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
We study the problem of finding the optimal assortment that maximizes expected revenue under the decision forest model, a recently proposed nonparametric choice model that is capable of representing any discrete choice model and in…
Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to stimulate…
In budget-feasible mechanism design, a buyer wishes to procure a set of items of maximum value from self-interested players. We have a valuation function $v:2^U \to \mathbb{R}_+$, where $U$ is the set of all items, where $v(S)$ specifies…
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…
We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an…
We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…