Related papers: A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules, …
We present and discuss a mixed conjunctive and disjunctive rule, a generalization of conflict repartition rules, and a combination of these two rules. In the belief functions theory one of the major problem is the conflict repartition…
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step…
Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the…
Given a set of items and a set of evaluators who all individually rank them, how do we aggregate these evaluations into a single societal ranking? Work in social choice and statistics has produced many aggregation methods for this problem,…
We interpret homogenousness as a second order property and base it on the same principle as nonmonotonic logic: there might be a small set of exceptions. We use this idea to analyse fundamental questions about defeasible inheritance…
We study the amalgamation property in positive logic. We give some connections between the amalgamation property and Robinson theories, model-complete theories and the Hausdorff property.
In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma, the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a general framework for the study of…
Aggregation processes with an arbitrary number of conserved quantities are investigated. On the mean-field level, an exact solution for the size distribution is obtained. The asymptotic form of this solution exhibits nontrivial ``double''…
We prove that for the intermediate logics with the disjunction property any basis of admissible rules can be reduced to a basis of admissible m-rules (multiple-conclusion rules), and every basis of admissible m-rules can be reduced to a…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in…
This paper studies preference aggregation under ambiguity when agents have incomplete preference relations due to imprecise beliefs. We introduce the "dual" of the Pareto principle, which respects unanimity among individuals, including…
We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given agent can…
Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for choosing one notion over another remain poorly understood.…
This paper studies preference aggregation under uncertainty in the multi-profile framework and characterizes a new class of aggregation rules that address classical concerns about Harsanyi's (1955) utilitarian rules. Our aggregation rules,…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
In this paper we explore the application of methods for classical judgment aggregation in pooling probabilistic opinions on logically related issues. For this reason, we first modify the Boolean judgment aggregation framework in the way…
Given only aggregate choice data and limited information about how menus are distributed across the population, we describe what can be inferred robustly about the distribution of preferences (or more general decision rules). We strengthen…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
The paper addresses aggregation issues for composite (modular) solutions. A systemic view point is suggested for various aggregation problems. Several solution structures are considered: sets, set morphologies, trees, etc. Mainly, the…