Related papers: Unchecked strategy diversification and collapse in…

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…

More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing the information about strategy choice between players residing on…

Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group…

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…

The complete cooperation and the complete defection are two typical strategies considered in evolutionary games in many previous works. However, in real life, strategies of individuals are full of variety rather than only two complete ones.…

Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly…

Behavior in repeated public goods games continues to challenge standard theory: heterogeneous social preferences can explain first-round contributions, but not the substantial volatility observed across repeated interactions. Using 50,390…

According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…

Understanding cooperative behavior in biological and social systems constitutes a scientific challenge, being the object of intense research over the past decades. Many mechanisms have been proposed to explain the presence and persistence…

Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer.…

This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…

Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However,…

Cyclic dominance has become a pivotal factor in sustaining cooperation within structured populations. However, this comprehension has predominantly revolved around node dynamics, where players are confined to employing the same strategy…

Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during…

Social institutions are systems of shared norms and rules that regulate people's behaviors, often emerging without external enforcement. They provide criteria to distinguish cooperation from defection and establish rules to sustain…

Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a…

While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges,…

Established already in the Biblical times, the Matthew effect stands for the fact that in societies rich tend to get richer and the potent even more powerful. Here we investigate a game theoretical model describing the evolution of…

Dynamic environments shape diverse dynamics in evolutionary game systems. We introduce spatial heterogeneity of resources into the prisoner's dilemma game model to explore coevolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback. The…

In binary decision-making, individuals often choose either the rare or the common action. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, the best-response update rule can be used to model this dichotomy. Those who prefer the common action…