Related papers: An operator view on alliances in politics

In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate $n$ votes i.i.d. according to a…

We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be…

Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influence each other's knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and…

A political party can be considered as a company whose value depends on the voters support i.e. on the percentage of population supporting the party. Dynamics of the support is thus as a stochastic process with a deterministic growth rate…

We consider abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition formability in this work. Taking a model from political alliance among political parties, we will contemplate profitability, and then formability, of a coalition. As is commonly…

Coalition formation is a fundamental type of interaction that involves the creation of coherent groupings of distinct, autonomous, agents in order to efficiently achieve their individual or collective goals. Forming effective coalitions is…

Choice constructs are an important part of the language of logic programming, yet the study of their semantics has been a challenging task. So far, only two-valued semantics have been studied, and the different proposals for such semantics…

Randomisation and time-sharing are some of the oldest methods to achieve fairness. I make a case that applying these approaches to social choice settings constitutes a powerful paradigm that deserves an extensive and thorough examination. I…

Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…

Coalition setting among a set of actors (countries, firms, individuals) is studied using concepts from the theory of spin glasses. Given the distribution of respective bilateral propensities to either cooperation or conflict, the phenomenon…

Decision making can be difficult when there are many actors (or agents) who may be coordinating or competing to achieve their various ideas of the optimum outcome. Here I present a simple decision making model with an explicitly…

Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…

Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system…

In this paper we will analyse a group of agents and their attitude to follow, or not, some rules. The model is based on some quantum-like ideas, and in particular on an Hamiltonian operator $H$ describing the dynamics of the agents,…

We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are…

For centuries, it has been widely believed that the influence of a small coalition of voters is negligible in a large election. Consequently, there is a large body of literature on characterizing the likelihood for an election to be…

We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of $j$ given losing coalitions into a set of $j$ winning coalitions.…

We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some…

Trisecting agents, issues, and agent pairs are essential topics of three-way conflict analysis. They have been commonly studied based on either a rating or an auxiliary function. A rating function defines the positive, negative, or neutral…

Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…